Probabilistic knowledge /

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Sarah Moss argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. She introduces the notion of probabilistic content and shows how it plays a central role not only in epistemology, but in the philosophy of mind and language. Just you can believe and assert propositions, you can...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser:
Moss, Sarah (Philosopher)
Format:
Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:
Englisch
Veröffentlicht:
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.
Ausgabe:
First edition.
Zusammenfassung:
Sarah Moss argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. She introduces the notion of probabilistic content and shows how it plays a central role not only in epistemology, but in the philosophy of mind and language. Just you can believe and assert propositions, you can believe and assert probabilistic contents.
Umfang:
1 online resource (xi, 268 pages)
Anmerkungen:
This edition previously issued in print: 2018.
Bibliografie:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:
0-19-251059-2
0-19-186126-X
0-19-251058-4
Schlagworte:
Probabilities > Philosophy.
Knowledge, Theory of.
Epistemic logic.
Semantics (Philosophy)
Assertion (Linguistics)
Conditionals (Logic)
Bezugswerke:
Links: