The normative and the evaluative : the buck-passing account of value /

Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for...

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Buck-passing account of value
Normative reasons for pro-attitudes
The buck-passing account of value
Motivations for the buck-passing account
Clarifying the buck-passing account
The Value-First Account and First-Order Neutrality
The requirement of neutrality
Value-of-the-object-first and deontology
Other value-first accounts and first-order neutrality
The Value-First Account and the Unity of the Normative
The case for the unity of the normative
The value-first account and the unity of the normative
Against the value-first account of reasons for belief
Objections to the unity of the normative
The Buck-Passing Account and The No-Priority View
Explaining the correlation between reasons and value
Explaining the fact that value never provides non-derivative reasons
Grounding reasons in value
Qualitative parsimony
Explaining similarities between theoretical debates about reasons and about value
The case against the no-priority view
Reasons as The Unity among the Varieties of Goodness
The need for an explanation of the unity among the varieties of goodness
A buck-passing account of good for
Objections to the buck-passing account of good for
A buck-passing account of goodness of a kind
Objections to the buck-passing account of goodness of a kind
The case for the buck-passing account of value
Defence --
Too Much Value?
The wrong kind of reason problem
Having a pro-attitude towards x for x's own sake
The demon's threat and normative and motivating reasons
The generality of reasons to desire and admire
Explaining the error
If the wrong kind of reason problem cannot be dissolved, it can be solved
Too Little Value?
The trans-world reasons response
Reisner on the trans-world reasons response
The counterfactual response
Reisner on the counterfactual response
Bykvist's too much variation in value objection
Not Sufficiently Neutral?
Deontology and the consequentialist/deontological distinction
Consequentialism about reasons for pro-attitudes
Williams's internalism
Other Evaluative Concepts and Properties
The buck-passing account and the thick evaluative
Problems with pro-attitudes?
We should accept the buck-passing account of value
A Buck-Passing Account of Morality
A buck-passing account of morality: articulation
Motivation: reasons to accept the buck-passing account
Defence: objections to the amends-based buck-passing account
Reasons First
Reasons and oughts
Axe reasons just good bases?
A dilemma for putting fittingness first
Are there reasons to put fittingness first?
A unified account of the practically normative
1. Verfasser:
Cosker-Rowland, Rach
Format:
Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:
Englisch
Veröffentlicht:
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2019.
Ausgabe:
First edition.
Zusammenfassung:
Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on some of the problems that the buck-passing account faces, such as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem. This text provides the first comprehensive motivation and defence of the buck-passing account of value. Richard Rowland argues that the buck-passing account explains several important features of the relationship between reasons and value, as well as the relationship between the different varieties of value, in a way that its competitors do not.
Umfang:
1 online resource (viii, 239 pages)
Anmerkungen:
This edition previously issued in print: 2019.
Bibliografie:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:
0-19-257023-4
0-19-187204-0
0-19-257022-6
Schlagworte:
Values.
Responsibility > Philosophy.
Ethics.
Responsibility.
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