Oxford studies in metaethics. Volume 11 /

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'Oxford Studies in Metaethics' is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. The eleventh volume of Oxford Studies in Metaethics includes...

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Weitere Titel:
Oxford studies in metaethics. Volume XI
Studies in metaethics.
Metaethics.
The metaethical insignificance of moral twin Earth /
Intuition, self-evidence, and understanding /
Moral testimony: once more with feeling /
Fitting attitudes, finkish goods, and value appearances /
Does MITE make right? On decision-making under normative uncertainty /
Proleptic reasons /
Reasons, oughts, and requirements /
Agents and "shmagents": an essay on agency and normativity /
Teleology and normativity /
Expressivism and normative metaphysics /
Moral realism without moral metaphysics /
Objectivity and truth: you'd better rethink it /
1. Verfasser:
Shafer-Landau, Russ
Weitere Verfasser:
Shafer-Landau, Russ (HerausgeberIn)
Format:
Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:
Englisch
Veröffentlicht:
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.
Ausgabe:
First edition.
Zusammenfassung:
'Oxford Studies in Metaethics' is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. The eleventh volume of Oxford Studies in Metaethics includes essays that span the broad range of metaethical investigation. The contents comprise the following contributions: J. L. Dowell, The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth; Philip Stratton-Lake, Intuition, Self-Evidence, and Understanding; Guy Fletcher, Moral Testimony: Once More with Feeling; Graham Oddie, Fitting Attitudes, Finkish Goods, and Value Appearances; Brian Hedden, Does MITE Make Right? On Decision-Making under Normative Uncertainty; Agnes Callard, Proleptic Reasons; Justin Snedegar, Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements; Connie S. Rosati, Agents and “Shmagents”: An Essay on Agency and Normativity; Matthew Silverstein, Teleology and Normativity; Billy Dunaway, Expressivism and Normative Metaphysics; Andrew Sepielli, Moral Realism without Moral Metaphysics; Sharon Street, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Rethink It.
Umfang:
1 online resource (xii, 344 pages).
Anmerkungen:
Previously issued in print: 2016.
Bibliografie:
Includes bibliographical referencs and index.
Schriftenreihe:
Oxford studies in metaethics ;
ISBN:
0-19-182877-7
Schlagworte:
Normativity (Ethics)
Decision making > Moral and ethical aspects.
Metaethics.
Ethics.
Periodicals.
Bezugswerke:
Links: