Humean nature : how desire explains action, thought, and feeling /
Neil Sinhababu defends the Humean Theory of Motivation, according to which desire drives all human action and practical reasoning. This theory helps us to understand core aspects of human nature, such as intention, the will, moral belief, emotion, and the self; and it has revolutionary consequences...
Gespeichert in:
- Weitere Titel:
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How desire explains action, thought, and feeling
Return of the Humean Theory --
Humean Theory of Motivation --
Smith's Puzzle and his Treachery --
Anti-Humean Views --
Developing a Psychological Theory --
Rest of this Book --
Five Properties of Desire --
Motivational Aspect --
Hedonic Aspect --
Attentional Aspect --
Amplification by Vividness --
Desire -- Belief Theory of Reasoning --
Desire and Pleasure --
Feeling of Obligation --
Darwall and Desires Formed in Deliberation --
Bromwich and Saying What You Believe --
Doring and Actions Expressing Emotion --
Hedonic Correlation --
Moral Judgment --
Emotional Perception Model --
Metaethics of Emotional Perception --
Color Analogy --
Experimental Evidence: Smells, Dumbfounding, and Psychopathy --
Experientialism, Not Internalism, about Morality --
Desire and Attention --
Schueler and Combining Premises in Reasoning --
Smith and the Explanation of Reasoning --
Setiya, Practical Knowledge, and Belief about Doing --
Shah and Velleman on Transparency in Deliberation --
Towards a Theory of Daydreams --
Intention --
Desire -- Belief Theory of Intention --
Bratman on Practical Deliberation and Planning --
Ross and Schroeder on Cognitive Limitations --
Pleasure and Intention --
Joint Intentions --
Desire and Vividness --
Procrastination --
Searle and Akrasia --
Scanlon, Reason-Judgments, and Akrasia --
Tenenbaum and the Robustness of Desire-Driven Motivation --
Predictable Irrationality and Dennett's Normativism --
Gendler and Alief --
Willpower --
Redirecting Attention to Control Vividness --
Holton on Effort, Ego-Depletion, and Training --
Sripada and Desire Strength in Willpower --
Levy and Kahneman's Dual-Process Framework --
Reasons --
Humean Psychology of Reasons --
Van Roojen and Acting on Advice about Reasons --
Kant's House of Lust and Practical Possibilities --
Scanlon and Bracketing Reasons --
Setiya and Reason-Choosing --
Enoch and Deliberative Indispensability --
Morality Isn't about Reasons --
Agency and the Self --
Humean Self-Constitution --
Wallace, Holton, and Agency in Desire --
Korsgaard and Unified Agency --
Moreau's Paradoxes of Character --
Velleman and Miller on Alienated Agency --
Frankfurt's Unwilling Addict and Pleasure in Goals --
Kant and I --
Metaethics for Humean Beings --
Human Incapabilism about Moral Judgment --
Cognitivist Internalism Falls into Incapabilism --
Smith's Disjunctive Internalism --
Sophisticated Noncognitivism Falls into Incapabilism --
Externalism about Moral Judgment and Motivation --
Come to Scotland with Me. - 1. Verfasser:
- Format:
- Elektronisch E-Book
- Sprache:
- Englisch
- Veröffentlicht:
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Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
2017.
- Ausgabe:
- First edition.
- Zusammenfassung:
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Neil Sinhababu defends the Humean Theory of Motivation, according to which desire drives all human action and practical reasoning. This theory helps us to understand core aspects of human nature, such as intention, the will, moral belief, emotion, and the self; and it has revolutionary consequences for ethics.
- Umfang:
- 1 online resource (ix, 214 pages) : illustrations
- Anmerkungen:
- This edition previously issued in print: 2017.
- Bibliografie:
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- ISBN:
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0-19-108647-9
0-19-182654-5
0-19-108646-0 - Schlagworte:
- Bezugswerke:
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Parallelausgabe: 0-19-878389-2
- Links: