The world in the head /

This book collects the best of the author's papers on mental representation and psychological explanation. Running through the chapters are a pair of themes: that explaining the mind requires functional analysis, not subsumption under ‘psychological laws’, and that the propositional attitudes —...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Weitere Titel:
What is it like to be a computer? --
The LOT of the causal theory of mental content --
Systematicity --
Systematicity and the cognition of structured domains /
Methodological reflections on belief --
Inexplicit information --
Representation and indication /
Representation and unexploited content /
Haugeland on representation and intentionality --
Truth and meaning --
Meaning and content in cognitive science /
Representational specialization : the synthetic a priori revisited --
Biological preparedness and evolutionary explanation /
Cognitive evolutionary psychology without representational nativism /
Connectionism and the rationale constraint on cognitive explanation --
'How does it work?' vs. 'What are the laws?' : two conceptions of psychological explanation.
1. Verfasser:
Cummins, Robert
Format:
Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:
Englisch
Veröffentlicht:
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2010.
Ausgabe:
1st ed.
Zusammenfassung:
This book collects the best of the author's papers on mental representation and psychological explanation. Running through the chapters are a pair of themes: that explaining the mind requires functional analysis, not subsumption under ‘psychological laws’, and that the propositional attitudes — belief, desire, intention — and their interactions, while real, are not the key to understanding the mind at a fundamental level. Taking these ideas seriously puts considerable strain on standard conceptions of rationality and reasoning, on truth-conditional semantics, and on our interpretation of experimental evidence concerning cognitive development, learning and the evolution of mental traits and processes. The temptation to read the structure of mental states and their interactions off the structure of human language is powerful and seductive, but has created a widening gap between what most philosophers and social scientists take for granted about the mind, and the framework we need to make sense of what an accelerating biology and neuroscience are telling us about brains. The challenge for the philosophy of mind is to devise a framework that accommodates these developments. This is the underlying motivation for this book.
Umfang:
1 online resource (x, 328 pages) : illustrations
Anmerkungen:
Description based upon print version of record.
Anmerkungen:
English
Bibliografie:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:
0-19-160946-3
0-19-180983-7
1-282-46581-3
9786612465819
0-19-157291-8
Schlagworte:
Mental representation.
Philosophy of mind.
Cognitive psychology.
Cognition.
Bezugswerke:
Links: