Repeated games and reputations : long-run relationships /

Weitere Versionen (2)

Provides a complete treatment of the theory of repeated games and reputations, beginning with the elementary concepts required to work with repeated games and continuing to research frontier. This book is for those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser:
Mailath, George Joseph
Weitere Verfasser:
Samuelson, Larry
Format:
Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:
Englisch
Veröffentlicht:
Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2006.
Zusammenfassung:
Provides a complete treatment of the theory of repeated games and reputations, beginning with the elementary concepts required to work with repeated games and continuing to research frontier. This book is for those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Umfang:
1 online resource (664 p.)
Anmerkungen:
Description based upon print version of record.
Anmerkungen:
English
Bibliografie:
Includes bibliographical references (p. 619-628) and index.
ISBN:
9786611162856
9781281162854
128116285X
9780198041214
0198041217
9781429440271
1429440279
Schlagworte:
Game theory.
Economics, Mathematical.
Economia matemàtica
Teoria de jocs
Llibres electrònics
Bezugswerke:
Links: