How things might have been : individuals, kinds, and essential properties /

Weitere Versionen (2)

How are we to distinguish between the essential and accidental properties of things such as individual people, cats, trees, and tables? Almost everyone agrees that such individuals could have been different, in certain respects, from the way that they actually are. But what are the respects in which...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Weitere Titel:
Individuals, kinds, and essential properties
1. Verfasser:
Mackie, Penelope
Format:
Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:
Englisch
Veröffentlicht:
Oxford : New York : Clarendon Press ; Published in the United States by Oxford University Press, 2006.
Zusammenfassung:
How are we to distinguish between the essential and accidental properties of things such as individual people, cats, trees, and tables? Almost everyone agrees that such individuals could have been different, in certain respects, from the way that they actually are. But what are the respects in which they could not have been different: which of their properties are essential to their being the individuals that they are? And why? Following the revival of interest among analytic philosophers in essentialism and de re modality generated by the work of Kripke and others in the 1970s, these question
Umfang:
1 online resource (xii, 212 pages) : illustrations
Anmerkungen:
Description based upon print version of record.
Anmerkungen:
English
Bibliografie:
Includes bibliographical references (p. [201]-205) and index.
ISBN:
0-19-160403-8
1-281-16451-8
9786611164515
0-19-153410-2
1-4356-2278-2
Schlagworte:
Essentialism (Philosophy)
Bezugswerke:
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