Algorithmic tacit collusion an analysis under European Competition Law

Weitere Versionen (2)

Tacit collusion through pricing algorithms is feasible and increasingly likely – and its effects may be as harmful as those of anticompetitive agreements. By virtue of a new approach set out in this study, Adrian Doerr shows how the law can and should respond within the existing legal framework.

Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser:
Doerr, Adrian
Format:
Abschlussarbeit Elektronisch E-Book Dissertation
Sprache:
Englisch
Veröffentlicht:
Tübingen Mohr Siebeck 2025
Zusammenfassung:
Tacit collusion through pricing algorithms is feasible and increasingly likely – and its effects may be as harmful as those of anticompetitive agreements. By virtue of a new approach set out in this study, Adrian Doerr shows how the law can and should respond within the existing legal framework.
Stillschweigende Absprachen durch Preisalgorithmen sind möglich und zunehmend wahrscheinlich, können jedoch in ihren Auswirkungen kartellrechtswidrigen Absprachen ähneln. Das Kartellrecht sollte daher dieser Entwicklung innerhalb des bestehenden Rechtsrahmens begegnen.
Tacit collusion is a well-studied phenomenon accepted in competition law as an anomaly that only occurs under specific conditions. However, with the rise of artificial intelligence, it is more likely that pricing algorithms could develop the ability to collude in more instances and without human interference. While neither tacit collusion nor its algorithmically induced version constitutes a concerted practice, algorithmic tacit collusion differs from a technical, economic, and policy perspective and therefore warrants alternative legal treatment. Algorithmically induced tacit collusion in fact resembles a cartel in its effects and should, in principle, also be treated as such. In his comprehensive study, Adrian Doerr develops a new approach within the existing regulatory framework to keep algorithmic tacit collusion in check.
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (XIX, 368 Seiten)
Schriftenreihe:
Beiträge zum Kartellrecht ; 29
ISBN:
9783161640407
DOI:
10.1628/978-3-16-164040-7
Zugangseinschränkungen:
Open Access
Schlagworte:
Europäische Union
Preisabsprache
Algorithmus
Kartellrecht
Free Riders
Akzeptanzsteigerung
Algorithm
AI
antitrust
competition law
Europe
Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht, Wirtschaftsrecht, Steuerrecht
Wirtschaftsrecht
Wettbewerb, Konzentration
Europarecht
Prophetic Reuse
Image-schema
Elfes-Urteil
Professoren-Richter
No-free-rider Nash Equilibrium
self-preferencing
regulating at scale
institutional imperfections
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