(Pro-) Social Learning and Strategic Disclosure /
We study a sequential experimentation model with endogenous feedback. Agents choose between a safe and risky action, the latter generating stochastic rewards. When making this choice, each agent is selfishly motivated (myopic). However, agents can disclose their experiences to a public record, and w...
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- Elektronisch E-Book
- Sprache:
- Englisch
- Veröffentlicht:
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Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2024.
- Zusammenfassung:
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We study a sequential experimentation model with endogenous feedback. Agents choose between a safe and risky action, the latter generating stochastic rewards. When making this choice, each agent is selfishly motivated (myopic). However, agents can disclose their experiences to a public record, and when doing so are pro-socially motivated (forward-looking). When prior uncertainty is large, disclosure is both polarized (only extreme signals are disclosed) and positively biased (no feedback is bad news). When prior uncertainty is small, a novel form of unraveling occurs and disclosure is complete. Subsidizing disclosure costs can perversely lead to less disclosure but more experimentation.
- Umfang:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Anmerkungen:
- May 2024.
- Schlagworte: