A Theory of Managed Trade /

This paper proposes a theory that predicts low levels of protection during periods of "normal" trade volume coupled with episodes of "special" protection when trade volumes surge. This dynamic pattern of protection emerges from a model in which countries choose levels of protecti...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser:
Bagwell, Kyle
Körperschaft:
National Bureau of Economic Research
Weitere Verfasser:
Staiger, Robert W.
Format:
Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:
Englisch
Veröffentlicht:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1988.
Zusammenfassung:
This paper proposes a theory that predicts low levels of protection during periods of "normal" trade volume coupled with episodes of "special" protection when trade volumes surge. This dynamic pattern of protection emerges from a model in which countries choose levels of protection in a repeated game setting facing volatile trade swings. High trade volume leads to a greater incentive to unilaterally defect from cooperative tariff levels. Therefore as the volume of trade expands, the level of protection must rise in a cooperative equilibrium to mitigate the rising trade volume and hold the incentive to defect in check.
Umfang:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Anmerkungen:
November 1988.
Schlagworte: