Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? /

This paper studies whether agents must agglomerate at a single location in a class of models of two-sided interaction. In these models there is an increasing returns effect that favors agglomeration, but also a crowding or market-impact effect that makes agents prefer to be in a market with fewer ag...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Weitere Titel:
Knife Edge of Plateau
1. Verfasser:
Ellison, Glenn
Körperschaft:
National Bureau of Economic Research
Weitere Verfasser:
Fudenberg, Drew
Format:
Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:
Englisch
Veröffentlicht:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2003.
Zusammenfassung:
This paper studies whether agents must agglomerate at a single location in a class of models of two-sided interaction. In these models there is an increasing returns effect that favors agglomeration, but also a crowding or market-impact effect that makes agents prefer to be in a market with fewer agents of their own type. We show that such models do not tip in the way the term is commonly used. Instead, they have a broad plateau of equilibria with two active markets, and tipping occurs only when one market is below a critical size threshold. Our assumptions are fairly weak, and are satisfied in Krugman's [1991b] model of labor market pooling, a heterogeneous-agent version of Pagano's [1989] asset market model, and Ellison, Fudenberg and Mobius's [2002] model of competing auctions.
Umfang:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Anmerkungen:
March 2003.
Schlagworte: