First-Person Thought Action, Identification and Experience
The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first q...
Gespeichert in:
- 1. Verfasser:
- Format:
- Elektronisch E-Book
- Sprache:
- Englisch
- Veröffentlicht:
-
Paderborn
Brill | mentis
2022
- Ausgabe:
- 1st ed.
- Zusammenfassung:
-
The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism.
- Umfang:
- 1 online resource (242 pages)
- Anmerkungen:
- Includes index.
- ISBN:
- 3-96975-264-7
- Schlagworte:
-
- Bezugswerke:
-
Parallelausgabe: 3-95743-264-2
- Links: