A bargaining perspective on vertical integration

This paper analyzes vertical integration incentives in a bilaterally duopolistic industry where input market outcomes are determined by bargaining. Vertical integration incentives are a combination of horizontal integration incentives up- and downstream and depend on the strength of substitutability...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser:
Döpper, Hendrik, Sapi, Geza, Wey, Christian
Format:
Buch
Sprache:
Englisch
Veröffentlicht:
Düsseldorf, Germany Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) May 2022
Zusammenfassung:
This paper analyzes vertical integration incentives in a bilaterally duopolistic industry where input market outcomes are determined by bargaining. Vertical integration incentives are a combination of horizontal integration incentives up- and downstream and depend on the strength of substitutability or complementarity and the shape of the unit cost function. In contrast to the widely prevailing view in competition policy, vertical integration can under particular circumstances convey more bargaining power to the merged entity than a horizontal merger to monopoly. In a bidding game for an exogenously determined target firm, a vertical merger can dominate a horizontal one, while pre-emption does not occur
Bestände:
  • Magazin: pfl/e8794(14)
Umfang:
53 Seiten
Schriftenreihe:
DICE Discussion Paper ; no 389
ISBN:
9783863043889
Schlagworte:
Bargaining
Vertical Mergers
Shapley Value
Graue Literatur
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