rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule
    sub title: A Model of Personal Rule
  title info:
    title: Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule
  name:
    name part: Acemoglu, Daron.
    role:
      role term: creator
  name:
    name part: Robinson, James A.
  name:
    name part: Verdier, Thierry.
  name:
    name part: National Bureau of Economic Research
  type of resource: text
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: mau
    place:
      place term: Cambridge, Mass
    publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
    date issued: 2003
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: remote
    extent: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
  abstract: Many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats', who implement highly inefficient economic policies, expropriate the wealth of their citizens, and use the proceeds for their own glorification or consumption. We argue that the success of kleptocrats rests, in part, on their ability to use a divide-and-rule' strategy, made possible by weaknesses in the institutions in these societies. Members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat, yet such cooperation may be defused by imposing punitive rates of taxation on any citizen who proposes such a move, and redistributing the benefits to those who need to agree to it. Thus the collective action problem can be intensified by threats which remain off the equilibrium path. In equilibrium, all are exploited and no one challenges the kleptocrat. Kleptocratic policies are more likely when foreign aid and rents from natural resources provide rulers with substantial resources to buy off opponents; when opposition groups are shortsighted; when the average productivity in the economy is low; and when there is greater inequality between producer groups (because more productive groups are more difficult to buy off).
  target audience: specialized
  note: Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, Thierry Verdier.
  note: December 2003.
  subject:
    topic: Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
  subject:
    topic: General
  classification: O12
  classification: H00
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w10136
  record info:
    record content source: MaCbNBER
    record creation date: 230622
    record change date: 20230622022740.0
    record identifier: 99370889081906441
    language of cataloging:
      language term: eng